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I. INTRODUCTION
The telecommunications marketplace is dramatically changing
our world. Cable lines will carry phone calls, phone wires will
deliver movies and the airwaves will carry both. This conver-
gence of technology will transform how we live, work, play and
shop. It will blur traditional industry lines. '
Convergence and mergers2 have blurred his-
toric service classifications, such as broadcast,
cable and common carrier. The Federal Commu-
nications Commission's ("FCC" or the "Commis-
sion") current regulatory framework developed
from services that were tied to a specific transmis-
sion medium.3 The underlying facilities devel-
oped independently under very different circum-
stances, and the regulatory scheme governing the
services delivered over those facilities reflected
their unique development. The current frame-
work is designed to regulate services based on the
underlying transmission medium4-telephone
wire, wireless telephony, broadcast (airwaves) or
cable plant. This method of regulation, however,
I Federal Communications Commission Chairman Wil-
liam E. Kennard, Address at the National Press Club, Tele-
communications @ the Millennium: The Telecom Act at
Four (last modified Feb. 9, 2000) <http://www.fcc.gov/
Speeches/Kennard/2000/spwek005.htm>.
2 The term merger in the context of this comment also
includes acquisitions or other combinations and transfers of
stock, assets or control that effectuate control of the entities
involved coming under a newly combined single entity.
3 In the telephone industry, for example, telephone ser-
vice is historically tied to the transmission media of copper
wire.
4 The author uses the term "transmission medium" to de-
note the underlying infrastructure that carries the communi-
cation transmission. For example, the transmission medium
for traditional telephony is the physical network of copper
wires historically used to carry telephone voice communica-
tions. Likewise, the transmission medium for cable television
is the cable coaxial network that carries television broadcast
signals. The transmission medium for wireless telephony is
the spectrum utilized to send and receive voice signals. See Eli
M. Noam, Principles for the Communications Act of 2034: The Su-
is being outmoded by new technology that allows
converged services to be delivered over one net-
work. Alternatively, the same service may be deliv-
ered over networks of differing transmission me-
dia.5 What was once carried as a broadcast service
is now available over the common carriers' wire-
lines as streaming video or audio; cable providers
are carrying voice service, once the domain of
common carriers; and High-Definition Digital
Television ("HDTV") supports data channels used
to provide high-speed internet access. As conver-
gence allows many services to be delivered over
one network, the current regulatory framework
that ties a particular service to a certain transmis-
sion medium is outmoded.6 Thus, basing a regula-
tory scheme on the assumption that a certain ser-
vice is tied to a specific underlying transmission
medium produces inconsistent rules. For exam-
ple, telephony over cable could be regulated as a
cable service or as a common carrier service. 7
perstructure of Infrastructure, para. 11 (visited Apr. 9, 2000)
<www.vii.org/papers/citi476.htm> (noting that one of the
major problems of the Communications Act of 1934 "is that
it deals with separate transmission media differently... [i]t is
not transmission path neutral").
5 It has been noted that broadcasting, telecommunica-
tions and the internet are fast converging into a "single mul-
timedia market in which TV operators supply voice teleph-
ony, telecommunications companies supply video images,
and where the internet is delivering both basic voice teleph-
ony and moving pictures." Campbell Cowie & Christopher T.
Marsden, Convergence, Competition and Regulation, INTERNA-
TIONAL JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY, para.
1 (June 1, 1998) <www.digital-law.net/lJCLP/1-1998/ijclp-
webdoc_61 1998.html> [hereinafter Cowie & Marsden].
6 The "cross-entry" of telecommunications and broad-
casting companies into the other's market has been said to
raise "significant and difficult transitional regulatory issues."
Cowie & Marsden, supra note 5, at para. 2.
7 See generally Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining
the Future in Terms of the Past, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 37
(1999) (describing the problem of regulating internet over
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Such rules may force providers to consider busi-
ness plans based on regulatory issues rather than
economic and technical motivations. Converged
technologies do not fit into the regulatory frame-
work shaped by the organizational structure, the
statutory structure or the rules of the FCC. As de-
livery of services converges over an increasing
number of transmission media, it becomes in-
creasingly arbitrary to regulate according to the
underlying transmission medium over which the
service happens to be delivered.8
Also, new innovations and technologies are ar-
riving at a pace that the current regulatory regime
cannot address or is too slow to handle effec-
tively.9 The FCC's regulatory scheme is dictated by
Congress, which directs the FCC to create rules in
furtherance of its statutory mandates. Thus, the
FCC's ability to effect change is limited. It can
only change the regulatory scheme as much as its
statutory directive allows. Changing the regulatory
scheme beyond the existing statutory strictures
would require congressional action to modify ex-
isting statutes or create new statutory language.
Adapting the statutory scheme to the fundamen-
tal changes brought about by convergence would
necessitate a legislative overhaul of the existing
statutes, which would be a lengthy process. Even if
the FCC can make changes in their rules within
the limits of the statutory framework, the
rulemaking process is lengthy as well. As a federal
agency, the FCC is subject to the Administrative
cable within the current regulatory framework).
8 See Johannes M. Bauer & Michelle F. Wilsey, National
and Supra-National Regulation of Cybernetworks and Telecommuni-
cations Carriers, Address at Cybercomm III, at para. 3, 8 (last
modified Sept. 27, 1996) <www.vii.org/papers/citi.htm> ("As
convergence has enabled different telecommunications sys-
tems to deliver similar if not identical services (internet te-
lephony, video on demand, cable, radio, etc.) a paradoxical
regulatory situation is created. Depending on the delivery
technology, functionally equivalent services and applications
may be subject to quite different sets of rules and regula-
tions.") [hereinafter Bauer & Wilsey].
9 Specific regulation may not be flexible enough to en-
compass new technology and "technological by-pass" may re-
sult in "regulatory obsolescence." See Cowie & Marsden, supra
note 5, at para. 29.
1o 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1999).
II See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1), 552, 553. The FCC has issued
its own procedural regulations in furtherance of the APA
rulemaking requirements, which require the FCC to allow no
less than a specified number of days for each step in its
rulemaking process. See generally 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.399-1.430
(1999). Specifically, the Commission must allow at least 30
days after public notice for filing of statements in support of
Procedure Act ("APA"), ° which requires time al-
lowances for notice and comment rulemaking."
Thus, the FCC is bound by procedural require-
ments to allow time in its rulemaking process to
give adequate notice to the public and time for
the public to formulate and submit meaningful
comments to the agency on the issue. Procedural
requirements aside, it is a difficult and time con-
suming task to write a rule that applies to all par-
ticipants in an industry sector, attempting to an-
ticipate any situation in which it might apply and
predict what the ramifications of the rule will be
in each circumstance. It is difficult to address rap-
idly evolving innovations within these lengthy
processes.
The current regulatory framework must be
changed to account for the new converged envi-
ronment.12 But changing the statutory underpin-
nings of communications regulation to accommo-
date this very different environment will entail a
lengthy legislative process. In the interim, it is un-
certain how converged technologies and compa-
nies that do not fit into the current regulatory
framework should be regulated. The FCC could
aptly solve the incompatibility of the present statu-
tory framework with converged entities and ser-
vices in this interim period by using its broad pub-
lic interest standard 13 to develop merger
conditions that do address converged services.
New technologies that are delivered over multiple
transmission media no longer fit the facilities-
or opposition to a petition for rulemaking; an additional 15
days for a reply to any statement of support or opposition;
and at least 30 days after publication of a final rule for it to
become effective. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.405(a-b), 1.427(a).
12 FCC Commissioner Michael Powell has said that con-
vergence between industry sectors will force the FCC and
Congress to make basic choices. See David Kaut, Ness Tries
Again to Quell Internet Rumors As Congress Bears Brunt of E-Mail
Hysteria, BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Mar. 29, 1999.
House Telecommunications Subcommittee Chairman
Tauzin also has spoken of "remissioning" the FCC to make it
compatible with a communications industry that is shifting
from "segmentation" to "convergence." See Tauzin Taps GOP
Task Force to Develop FCC Restructuring Ideas, BNA DAILY RE-
PORT FOR EXECUTIVEs, Apr. 21, 1999.
13 As explained later in this article, the FCC's public in-
terest standard includes consideration of whether a merger is
consistent with the goals of the Communications Act of 1934,
Commission rules and federal communications policy. This
includes goals, such as fostering a competitive and deregu-
latory environment, maintenance and growth of a universal
service program, and timely deployment of advanced com-
munications services. See discussion infra Part II.C and ac-
companying footnotes.
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based14 regulatory scheme, and can be regulated
more quickly through merger conditioning than
through the formulation or modification of stat-
utes or agency rules. Such a regulatory scheme
can be changed quickly in response to market and
technological developments.15 Although only the
merging parties are subject to the merger condi-
tions-as opposed to the entire industry being
subject to a statute or regulation-the industry
impact will still be significant. Assuming the
trends in mergers continue, 16 the number and
size of companies merging will amplify the effect
of individual merger conditions. Although the an-
ticipation of merger conditions on converged
technologies might have a deterrent effect on
companies considering mergers, generally,
merger conditions have not significantly inhibited
the overall number of mergers. Similarly, merger
conditions have not prevented substantially large
companies from attempting to merge, such as
SBC-Ameritech or MCI-British Telecom. Thus,
the risk of inhibiting efficient mergers does not
seem high enough to prevent the use of merger
conditions to regulate converged services. This
form of regulation also presents a chance to de-
velop finely tailored regulations for one specific
set of circumstances, rather than creating rules
applicable to an entire industry that must antici-
pate all applications of the rule in all circum-
stances. There is also the advantage that the nas-
cent technology is only "regulated" when the
merged company is involved. Other companies
with that technology do not fall under the condi-
tion. If the regulation has unintended effects, it
will not impact that technology across the board.
Therefore, any deleterious impact is reduced. A
merger condition is also much easier to change
than a statute or an agency rule. While a change
of a rule would require going through the formal
rulemaking process, a change to a merger condi-
tion is an adjudication that would merely require
14 The term facilities-based regulation denotes regula-
tion based on the underlying transmission medium. For a
general discussion of the concept of regulation of facilities,
as opposed to regulation of services or content, see Bauer &
Wilsey, supra note 8, at para. 12.
15 Rather than creating new rules or modifying existing
rules, different conditions (or no conditions) can be im-
posed on the next merging parties. See id. at para. 22 (stating
that the speed of change in the industry necessitates a regula-
tory framework allowing the most room for experimentation
and evolutionary processes).
16 For example, the Federal Trade Commission stated in
grant of a petition submitted by the merged com-
pany.
The first section of this comment will discuss
the technological, regulatory and economic
forces driving the current merger wave, demon-
strating why the merger trend is likely to continue
in the near term. The comment will then describe
the FCC's regulatory framework, as established by
its enabling act, self-created regulatory framework
and organizational structure. In analyzing this
framework, it will discuss how FCC regulation by
transmission media is ill suited to a converged en-
vironment. Next, the comment describes the ana-
lytical framework for merger review, and how the
FCC's unique public interest standard within that
review allows for creation of merger conditions to
address converged services. The next section dis-
cusses specific examples of merger conditioning,
showing that merger conditions can be used to
regulate converged services. It will also identify
where traditional regulatory thinking, based on
transmission media, has overlooked mergers that
may lessen competition in this newly converged
environment. The comment then discusses the
benefits of merger conditioning as an interim sub-
stitute for traditional regulations, when used
within certain guidelines. The last section will
conclude that, with certain provisions, merger
conditioning is an apt approach to regulation in
this era of convergence, until the current regula-
tory framework is changed.
II. MERGER WAVE DRIVING FORCES:
DEREGULATION, ECONOMICS,
CONVERGENCE
A. Merger Wave Driving Forces
The current merger wave is driven by several
factors, such as the deregulatory environment cre-
ated by the Telecommunications Act of 199617
its 1998 Annual Report that the number of pre-merger filings
in 1998 increased 28% over the previous year to 4,728, three
times the number in 1991. See F.T.C. ANN. REP. 8 (1998).
17 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). Deregulation in industries,
such as the telecommunications industry, allows companies
to achieve new economies of scale and scope, causing some
of the greatest merger activity. See Richard G. Parker & David
A. Balto, The Merger Wave: Trends in Merger Enforcement and
Litigation, 55 Bus. LAw. 353, 354 (1999) [hereinafter Parker
& Balto].
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(the "1996 Act" or "Telecommunications Act"),
the economics of company business models and
technological advancements resulting in conver-
gence. Today's mergers are driven by the rapidly
changing economy, and considerations of effi-
ciency and competitiveness, including deregula-
tion, industry consolidation, technological change
and strategic maintenance of market strength.' 8
This merger wave dates back to the early 1990s
and reflects strategic acquisitions between syner-
gistic companies with related services or prod-
ucts.'
9
B. The 1996 Act
The Telecommunications Act spurred the re-
cent wave of mergers in the communications in-
dustry.20 The pro-competitive goals of the 1996
Act 2 ' created a competitive environment, which
threatened incumbent market participants. This
pro-competitive environment necessarily spurred
innovation and made new ventures less risky by re-
ducing barriers to entry. Existing and newly suc-
cessful companies, however, are driven to merge
in order to compete in this marketplace of rapid
innovation and increasing competition. Yet, be-
cause barriers to entry have been lowered, a com-
pany may feel that in order to maintain market
presence, it must merge with another company to
quickly gain increased market presence and pre-
18 See Parker & Balto, supra note 17, at 356.
19 See id. at 353.
20 See Richard E. Wiley, Developments in Communications
Law: Competition, Consolidation and Convergence, 584 PLI PAT-
ENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 0089 153, 159 (1999); see also
Jason E. Friedrich, Thinkable Mergers: The FCC's Evolving Public
Interest Standard, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 261, 262 (1998)
(stating that "the 1996 Act has been answered with increased
consolidation," and noting FCC Chairman Htmndt's remark
that in transition from a monopoly to competitive environ-
ment, telecommunications mergers will increase because
they allow entry into new markets cheaper and faster than de
novo entry) [hereinafter Friedrich].
21 The preamble to the 1996 Act reads, "An Act to pro-
mote competition." Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.)
22 See Parker & Balto, supra note 17, at 354; see also Michel
Kerf & Damien Geradin, Controlling Market Power in Telecom-
munications Antitrust vs. Sector-Specific Regulation an Assessment
of the United States, New Zealand and Australian Experiences, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 919 n.177 (1999) (giving the example of
incumbent local telephone companies driven to merge in or-
der to consolidate their market position).
23 Efficiencies refer to better utilization of assets that al-
low a company to achieve lower costs, higher quantity and
better quality. See Dep't. of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n
vent new competitors from rapidly eroding its
market share.22
C. Economic Factors
Economic factors drive companies to merge to
take advantage of efficiencies, economies of scale
or economies of scope. 23 In an industry where a
few large companies often dominate markets,
merging generates immediate muscle to compete
against these companies. A merger can give a
company increased economies of scale in advertis-
ing, product development and customer reach
that approach levels of dominant competitors.
Economies of scope can also be obtained where
the merging companies combine complementary
products, services or capabilities to provide cus-
tomers more comprehensive or higher quality of-
ferings.
D. Technological Factors-Convergence
Rapid technological advances in all areas of
communications make it difficult for any one
company to stay on the cutting edge with product
and service offerings. Mergers provide a way to
quickly offer the latest technological advances24
or enter a related industry sector. 25 Acquiring a
company that has a technological innovation is
often more timely and less costly than developing
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) (1992), 57 Fed. Reg. 41,532 [hereinafter Horizontal
Merger Guidelines].
24 See Erin M. Reilly, Comment, The Telecommunications
Industry in 1993: The Year of the Merger, 2 COMMLAw CONSPEC-
rus 95, 96 (1994) (noting that the merger wave can be attrib-
uted to several factors, one of which is new technology that
compels companies to pool technological and economic re-
sources to be able to compete effectively) [hereinafter
Reilly].
25 See Aimee M. Adler, Competition in Telephony: Perception
or Reality? Current Barriers to the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
7J.L. & POL'y 571, 591-92 (1999) (noting that mergers are
used to enter new markets); see also Reilly, supra note 24, at 99
(citing Dan Dorfman, Pro Pushes Telecommunications, USA To-
DAY, Aug. 20, 1993, at 2B, who notes that the significance of
some mergers is the blurring of regulatory borders between
cable, telephone and wireless). Also note that this phenome-
non was brought to the attention of the Senate when Com-
merce Committee Chairman John McCain introduced The
Telecommunications Ownership Diversity Act of 1999 and
stated that convergence has caused companies in the com-
munications industry to merge in order to expand into new
markets. See The Telecommunications Ownership Diversity Act of
1999: Hearing on S. 1711 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
106th Cong. (1999).
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the product or service internally. 26 In addition,
communications companies are increasingly look-
ing to offer "bundled" services (long distance and
local telephony; or local telephony, cable televi-
sion and cable internet access)2 7 and find it easier
to enter the necessary markets by merging with
existing participants rather than developing their
own service offerings. The increasing intercon-
nection and interrelatedness of previously distinct
market sectors is driving companies to merge be-
cause mergers facilitate timely entry into related
markets without the cost of development, build-
ing infrastructure, 28 gaining needed expertise,
and refocusing company goals and organiza-
tion.29
1. Convergence Defined
Convergence represents the merging of voice,
data, video and other services onto a common
platform. In a converged environment, voice ser-
vice, video and data service are provided over a
single device, such as a personal computer, on a
common, packet-based 3° platform. The platform
that is facilitating this convergence is the internet.
The convergence of services onto the internet
truly represents a paradigm shift in the way we
communicate, receive entertainment and share
information.
2. Internet Over All... Internet Under All
The internet is the global network of com-
26 "[T]he future belongs to innovative companies that
can forge alliances quickly to develop and bring ideas to the
market first and best." Reilly, supra note 24, at 106 (quoting
COMM. DAILY, Mar. 10, 1993, at 8).
27 Companies, notably those in the telecommunications
industry, increasingly look to offer a bundle of services that
cross industry lines. This makes it likely that there will be an
increasing number of cross-industry mergers. See Parker &
Balto, supra note 17, at 354; see also Reilly, supra note 24, at
106 (noting MCI's goal of delivering voice, data and video
services over its network).
28 See Reilly, supra note 24, at 100 (noting that most cable
companies cannot afford to invest in new infrastructure, and
that the quickest and most efficient way to gain access to te-
lephony infrastructure and ensure their viability as effective
competitors is by merging with a telephone company).
29 Mergers enable companies to quickly gain assets and
capabilities necessary to enter new product markets. See
Parker & Balto, supra note 17, at 354.
30 A packet is a data unit routed through the network
that also contains address (source and destination) and error
checking information. See ANNABEL Z. DODD, THE ESSENTIAL
puters, interconnected through the common use
of the Internet Protocol ("IP").31 IP refers to a set
of protocols implemented on the machines that
compose the internet, while the term "internet"
refers to the global network of interconnected
computers and devices. The ability to send infor-
mation in digital format, as ones and zeros, has
allowed for development of many new technolo-
gies and transmission of the same kind of infor-
mation over multiple platforms, including the in-
ternet.3 2 The internet allows for computers
operating on dissimilar networks to exchange in-
formation in the form of digital packets. But the
internet has done more than allow dissimilar net-
works of computers to interface and exchange in-
formation. The internet is also a commonality
that allows services previously tied to a distinct
transmission medium to be delivered over any
transmission medium.3 3 It is the "universal trans-
lator" that allows a service to be carried over any
transmission medium and thus, fosters conver-
gence.
a. The Internet Over All
IP may ride efficiently on many different types
of transmission media. IP is currently supported
on any of a multitude of transmission media: cop-
per twisted pair, enhanced copper twisted pair
(DSL), 34 fiber, cable coaxial, wireless (cellular),
fixed point-to-point wireless, satellite, etc. There-
fore, you will be able to provide any service over
any of the above transmission media using IP.
GUIDE TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS 238 (1998) [hereinafter
DODD].
31 IP here refers to the Transmission Control Protocol/
Internet Protocol ("TCP/IP") protocol suite. TCP/IP is a
suite of protocols and applications or rules that act as a com-
mon standard by which devices and networks can understand
each other and interface to support data services. See DODD,
supra note 30, at 240, 237. TCP/IP is nonproprietary and
nonlicensed, or "open," thus allowing anyone to implement
this protocol. See id. at 228.
32 See FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE DEATii OF DISTANCE
13-14 (1997).
33 See id. at 89 (stating that the internet is capable of car-
rying anything that can be expressed in digital form).
34 DSL stands for digital subscriber line, which is a tech-
nology that enhances performance of existing copper tele-
phone wirelines with modems on either end of the line that
perform advanced signal processing, digital multiplexing and
compression algorithms to send data at speeds of 2-8 Mbps
downstream (to the user). See PETER W. HUBER ET. AL, FED.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 990 at § 11.2.2.2 (1999).
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One way to think of this capability is to liken it to
the ability of a computer operating system, like
Microsoft Windows, to run on many different
types of computers, such as Compaq, Dell, Gate-
way or computer workstations. Here, IP functions
like the computer operating system, having the
ability to ride over many types of transmission me-
dia.
b. The Internet Under All
Internet Protocol supports a multitude of ser-
vices. IP serves as a platform to carry video (broad-
cast and conferencing), voice, data and more.
Converged services include data services, such as
web access, business transactions and virtual pri-
vate networks; voice services, such as local and
long distance, enhanced features and call centers;
video, such as streaming between users, broadcast
TV and video on demand; and other services,
such as monitoring and telemetry, and new secur-
ity systems. This can be likened to the ability of a
computer operating system to run many different
programs, such as word processing, graphic edit-
ing, internet browsers or spreadsheet applica-
tions. Again, IP functions like the computer oper-
ating system with the ability to support many
different services like voice, data or video.
3. Significance of Convergence on Mergers
In the short term, it is reasonable to assume
that convergence will continue at internet speeds,
producing more convergent technology and rap-
idly moving toward a converged environment. In
the long term, it is likely that convergence will
force major regulatory reform. The development
of a convergent technology provides consumers
35 See Reilly, supra note 24, at 111 (noting that more com-
panies are using mergers to cross the ownership boundaries
of cable and telephony in order to converge different tech-
nology types).
36 The race to offer bundled services across industry lines
will likely increase the number of cross-industry mergers. See
Parker & Balto, supra note 17, at 354.
17 The FCC derives its authority and regulatory mandate
mainly from the Communications Act of 1934 and the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, which amended the 1934 Act.
Communications Act of 1934, Title I, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-714); Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996. [The 1934 Act, as amended by the
1996 Act, may be collectively referred to as the "Communica-
tions Act" for the purposes of this comment.] Additional stat-
utes, such as the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 and
an alternative to the existing offering. This natu-
rally threatens incumbents invested in offering
that existing service, which may look to mergers
to acquire new service offerings. In addition, con-
vergence has prompted a race to offer bundled
services. Given the speed of technological ad-
vances, existing companies may find that the most
efficient way to ensure their market presence is to
acquire a company possessing the technology they
wish to offer.3 5 Given the time necessary and the
man hours required to refocus a company to pro-
duce a technology divergent from their own, this
may not be a feasible option. Therefore, the
merger trend is likely to continue.3 6 With the con-
tinued rapid deployment of convergent technol-
ogy and the merger trend producing converged
companies, the current regulatory scheme will be-
come increasingly outmoded, forcing the need
for regulatory change.
III. FCC REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. The FCC's Statutory Framework
As this section will explain, the FCC's statutory
framework was predicated on the assumption that
a particular service is tied to a particular transmis-
sion medium, which conflicts with today's conver-
gence across industry sectors. The FCC is an inde-
pendent agency created by Congress and
therefore operates pursuant to statutory author-
ity.3 7 The Commission's statutory framework is di-
vided along lines of underlying transmission me-
dia. Each Title or Act was designed to regulate a
particular service, tied to a particular transmission
medium. For example, Title II of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 regulates "common carriers," 38
which originally provided basic telephony. Title
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992 give the Commission further regulatory authority
and mandates. Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419 [hereinafter 1962 Satellite Act];
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 [hereinafter
1992 Cable Act].
38 See 47 U.S.C. § 201. Title II regulates common carriers,
which are defined as "for hire, in interstate or foreign com-
munication by wire or radio" except broadcasting. Communi-
cations Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(10). The 1996 Act went
on to define a "telecommunications carrier" as:
any provider of telecommunications services-telecom-
munications for a fee directly to the public, regardless of
the facilities used, except that the Commission shall de-
termine whether to treat fixed and mobile satellite ser-
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VI of the 1934 Communications Act,39 and the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Com-
petition Act of 199240 govern cable communica-
tions. Title II of the 1996 Act governs broadcast
services, generally mass media -AM and FM ra-
dio and television. 41 Title II of the 1934 Act cov-
ers wireless telecommunications services. 42 Fi-
nally, the Communications Satellite Act of 196243
governs satellite transmission.
By adding special provisions, the 1996 Act at-
tempted to prevent new services and technologies
from being regulated under an old regulatory
scheme. These provisions are exceptional in that
the transmission medium is irrelevant, whereas
other sections of the Communications Act assume
a particular service is tied to a specific transmis-
sion medium. There is a provision for "advanced
services" that mandates that the FCC promote the
development and deployment of advanced ser-
vices "without regard to any transmission media
or technology." 44 The 1996 Act also distinguishes
"information services" from "telecommunications
services,"' 45 expressly exempting information ser-
vices from the same regulation as telecommunica-
tions services by carving out a separate definition.
In the 1996 Act, Congress explicitly stated that the
internet and interactive computer services should
vice as common carriage-and a telecommunications
carrier shall only be treated as a common carrier to the
extent it offers telecommunications services.
Telecommunications Act of 1996 at § 3(44), (46).
39 Communications Act of 1934 at §§ 601-714.
40 1992 Cable Act, supra note 37.
41 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 at §§ 202, 207.
42 See Communications Act of 1934 at §§ 301-399(B).
43 1962 Satellite Act, supra note 37.
44 Advanced services are defined by § 706 as any "high-
speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability
that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice,
data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any tech-
nology." Section 706(a), Pub.L. 104-104, Title VII, § 706, Feb.
8, 1996, 110 Stat. 153, reproduced in the notes under 47
U.S.C. §157;
45 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 at § 3(20), (46).
The 1996 Act defined telecommunications services as "trans-
mission, between or among points specified by the user, of
information of the user's choosing, without change in form
or content of the information as sent and received," and in-
formation services as "offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing, or making available information via telecommuni-
cations." Id. at § 153 (20), (46).
46 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (stating that the internet
and other interactive computer services should remain "un-
fettered by Federal or State regulation").
47 The D.C. Circuit has decided the FCC has some leeway
in its choice of regulatory tools used to further its Congres-
not be regulated. 46 Although, Congress made an
attempt in the 1996 Act to provide for new tech-
nologies and services, the provisions did not reach
far enough and did not account for many emerg-
ing services. As noted in the introduction, chang-
ing the statutory framework through the legisla-
tive process is an intensive and time-consuming
effort. Although Congress will likely need to reo-
pen the Communications Act to account for eco-
nomic, competitive and technological changes, a
comprehensive overhaul of the current legislation
may take years. Therefore, an interim solution is
needed to deal with immediate inconsistencies.
B. The FCC's Rules Framework
The FCC has also created regulatory limits
through its own promulgation of rules and regula-
tions in furtherance of statutory mandates and its
own policy goals, 47 which extend the framework
that assumes a specific service is tied to a specific
transmission medium. There have been a series of
Commission decisions that have shaped the regu-
lation of today's converged services. 4s These deci-
sions date back to the Computer I Order,49 Computer
II Orde ° and Computer III Order.51 A later order
sional mandate. See Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregula-
tion of the Internet, 584 PLI PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND LITERACY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 0089
231, 242 (1999) (citing Philadelphia Television Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 282, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1966)) [hereinafter
Oxman].
48 This comment notes only the pertinent Commission
decisions made in relation to converged services. For a dis-
cussion of the historical background and technical and policy
considerations underpinning these decisions, see Oxman,
supra note 47.
49 In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the
Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services
and Facilities, Final Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) [hereinaf-
ter Computer I Order]. In the Computer I Order, the Commission
required companies to separate regulated common carrier
activities from nonregulated data processing activities. See
HENK BRANDS AND EvAN T. LEO, THE LAw AND REGULATION OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS 478-79 (1999) [hereinafter
BRANDS & LEO].
50 In re Amendment of Section 64,702 of the Commis-
sion's Rules and Regulations, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384
(1980), reconsidered, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84
F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), and further reconsidered, Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512
(1981), and affd, Computer and Communications Indus.
Ass'n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and cert. denied,
461 U.S. 938 (1983) [hereinafter Computer II Order]. The
Commission's Computer II decision distinguished between
"basic" and "enhanced" services. It defined basic services as
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asserted ancillary jurisdiction 52 over information
services, but recognized that they do not fall
under Title II regulation, 53 and that they include
enhanced services and protocol processing used
in internet protocol.54 In a Report to Congress,55
the FCC stated it would continue to classify In-
ternet Service Providers ("ISPs") as information
service providers, which are not regulated under
Title II and not mandated to contribute to the
Universal Service Fund.56 It noted that although
computer-to-computer IP telephony would not be
regulated, phone-to-phone IP telephony (using
"smart" phones) resembled traditional telephony
more closely and would likely be regulated as a
telecommunications service. 57 This approach
deviates from traditional regulation by transmis-
sion medium and would seem more logical in a
converged environment where a service, such as
telephony, can be delivered over a number of
transmission media. Nonetheless, this was merely
a forward-looking policy statement, not a
rulemaking. The FCC recently decided that ISP
"pure transmission capability over a communications path
that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with
customer supplied information," and enhanced services as
"any offering over the telecommunications network, which is
more than a basic transmission service." Computer II Order, 77
F.C.C.2d at 420, para. 96. It further found that it has jurisdic-
tion over enhanced services, but would forebear from regu-
lating them. See Computer H Order, 77 F.C.C.2d at 428, para.
114. Thus, an enhanced service provider is exempt from
most Title II regulation as they are viewed as providers of a
service that is beyond a telecommunications service. See id.
51 In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commis-
sion's Rules and Regulations, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) [here-
inafter Computer III Order]. Computer Ill imposed a "non-struc-
tural safeguards" system that required Bell Operating
Companies ("BOCs") to provide nondiscriminatory intercon-
nection for enhanced service providers. See Computer III Order,
77 F.C.C.2d at 387-88, para. 8.
52 See 47 U.S.C. § 154(i).
53 See In re Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safe-
guards of Section 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 11 FCC Rcd. 21905, 21934, para. 59 n.123
(1996).
54 See id. at 21955, paras. 103-04. Thus, telecommunica-
tions service equates to a basic service, and information ser-
vice roughly equates to an enhanced service.
55 In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,
Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11547, para. 96 (1998)
[hereinafter Universal Service Report to Congress].
56 See id. at 11549, para. 100.
57 See id. at 11549, para. 98. For an in depth discussion of
IP telephony regulatory and policy issues, see Leonardj. Ken-
nedy & Lori A. Zallaps, If It Ain't Broke... The FCC and In-
ternet Regulation, 7 COMMLAw CONSPErUS 17 (1999). The aut-
thors note the challenge to the Commission in applying the
statutory framework created by Congress to emerging ser-
vices, particularly those offered by cable operators and cor-
traffic is "largely interstate,"' 58 but classified ISPs as
"end users" so that access charges are not applica-
ble. 59 In contrast, other service providers that
carry interstate traffic are required to pay access
charges to local exchange carriers ("LECs") to
compensate LECs for transferring traffic onto
their lines. 6° Such inconsistencies, based on cate-
gorizing services according to their underlying
transmission medium, leave uncertainty and the
potential for new business models to exploit the
vagueness of the regulations. 61
Convergence outmodes these definitions and
rules so they no longer adequately categorize ser-
vices or providers. For example, modern digital
telephony systems transmit information as strings
of ones and zeroes that are by the nature of mod-
ern communications technology, being trans-
formed and processed, frequently generated, ac-
quired, retrieved and stored, at least briefly. The
service is telephony; however, this process fits the
statutory definition of an information service.
Modern packet switches, 62 routers63 and bridges64
mon carriers. See id. at 18-19. They also note that communi-
cations services have traditionally been separated into
distinct categories with broadcast carrying radio and televi-
sion signals; telephone companies carrying one-to-one voice
communications; and cable delivering additional television
broadcast. See id. at 20. The authors continue to say that as
networked "multi-purpose terminal devices" become wide-
spread, the distinctions between the discrete communica-
tions markets will fade, and have already begun to do so, with
cable companies offering telephone service and telephone
companies offering video service. See id. at 21.
58 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provi-
sions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Inter-Carier
Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 14 FCC Rcd. 3689,
3690, at para 1 (1999).
511 See Universal Service Report to Congress, supra note 55, at
11547, para. 96.
6( For example, a long-distance carrier must transfer its
traffic from the edge of its long-distance network onto the
LEC's local network in order to get to the end user. See
BRANDS & LEO, supra note 49, at 36.
61 FCC Commissioner Powell pointed out these inconsis-
tencies when he said that traditional regulatory categories
have an "increasing Alice in Wonderland quality" with the
convergence across industry sectors. See David Kaut, Ness Tries
Again to Quell Internet Rumors As Congress Bears Brunt of E-Mail
Hysteria, BNA DAILY REPORr FOR EXECUTIVES, Mar. 29, 1999.
62 A packet switch forwards a packet through a network
based on a pre-determined route. See DODD, supra note 30, at
238.
63 Routers are devices within a physical network that for-
ward packets of information over the best available network
segment to the next router toward the packets' ultimate des-
tination. See DoDD, supra note 30, at 239.
64 Bridges are devices that connect small numbers of net-
works together that do not need routing intelligence. See
DODD, supra note 30, at 234.
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contain digital signaling processing chips and spe-
cialized data communications computers funda-
mental to modern communications that fre-
quently change the form of the information they
route. Thus, the terms "telecommunications" and
"information" do not reflect either the policy pur-
poses of the distinction or a difference that will
survive convergent technologies. 65
C. The FCC's Organizational Structure
The FCC's organizational structure also helped
to establish and perpetuate regulation according
to transmission medium, as the agency is divided
into bureaus and offices on this basis.66 Five bu-
reaus67 regulate the delivery of a specific service
over a specific transmission medium. The Com-
mon Carrier and Wireless Telecommunications
Bureaus were formed primarily to regulate two-
way voice communications, 68 while the Cable, 69
Mass Media 70 and International Bureaus 71 were
formed mainly to regulate the one-way broadcast
of signals.72 This segregated organizational struc-
ture, with each bureau dealing with only one
65 Some in the communications industry have noted that
different treatment for data traffic and voice traffic is not
good policy, and is not possible in this era of technological
convergence. See David Kaut, Tauzin, Dingell Offer Bell Data Re-
lief Bill; Hollings Measure Threatens Bells With Fines, BUREAU OF
NAT'L AFF. DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, July 2, 1999.
66 See Cowie & Marsden, supra note 5, at paras. 31, 34
(noting that the FCC is comprised of "specialist" bureaus,
each dedicated to a particular part of the communications
industry, in contrast to Australia, which initiated general
competition law in place of industry-specific regulation with
the establishment of the Australian Competition and Con-
sumer Commission in 1997).
67 In August of 1999 FCC Chairman Kennard introduced
a strategic plan to reorganize the FCC. See FCC Chairman
William E. Kennard, Draft Strategic Plan: A New FCC for the 21st
Century (last modified Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/
21st.century/draftstrategic-plan.txt> [hereinafter Draft
Strategic Plan]. Two new bureaus were created: the Consumer
Information Bureau, handling public inquiries and com-
plaints, and the Enforcement Bureau, designed to consoli-
date enforcement functions of all bureaus, enforcing the
Communications Act, FCC rules and other FCC policies. See
id.
68 The Common Carrier Bureau traditionally regulated
the provision of voice over a copper wireline infrastructure,
and the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau regulated two-
way voice transmission over the airwaves. See Common Car-
rier Bureau (last updated June 6, 2000) <http://www.fcc.
gov/ccb>; Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Who We
Are (last updated June 16, 2000) <http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/
organization>.
69 The Cable Bureau was established in 1993 to regulate
television signals over a coaxial cable plant. See generally 1992
transmission medium, conflicts with the ongoing
convergence of industry sectors. 73
Realizing that a converging environment has
outmoded its organizational structure, Chairman
Kennard announced a five-year FCC strategic plan
in late 1999, called "A New FCC for the 21st Cen-
tury." The goal is to reorganize the agency infra-
structure to be conducive to convergence, creat-
ing a "model agency" for the digital age.7 4 The
draft plan acknowledged that the FCC was organ-
ized along traditional technology lines of wire,
wireless, satellite, broadcast and cable, and that
technological convergence is blurring these estab-
lished lines. The plan recognized that the agency
should be restructured along functional lines
rather than by the underlying transmission me-
dium. 75 The agency is being restructured along
functional lines of enforcement, consumer infor-
mation, licensing, competition/policy and inter-
national matters, replacing the traditional facili-
ties-based structure. 76 Toward implementation,
the Commission is to examine the effect of com-
petition and convergence to determine what areas
Cable Act, supra note 37.
70 The Mass Media Bureau regulates broadcast of AM,
FM and television stations. See Federal Communications
Commission, Bureaus and Offices, Mass Media Bureau (last
updated Apr. 6, 2000) <http://www.fcc.gov/bureaus.html>.
71 The International Bureau was established in October
1994 to regulate satellite broadcast. In addition, the bureau
handles international settlements, treaties and other interna-
tional telecommunications policy. See Federal Communica-
tions Commission, Bureaus and Offices, International Bu-
reau (last updated Apr. 6, 2000) <http://www.fcc.gov/
bureaus.html>.
72 It has been noted that in most countries, separate reg-
ulatory frameworks were created for telephony and broad-
casting because telephony was originally seen as a natural
monopoly, making market entry and price controls necessary
as a substitute for market competition, whereas broadcasting
was regulated due to the scarcity of the medium. See Buaer &
Wilsey, supra note 8, at 1 1.
73 Congress itself has taken note of this situation with at
least one member, House Commerce Telecommunications
Subcommittee Chairman Tauzin, specifically pointing to this
in an interview. See David Kaut, House Panel Puts FCC Under
Microscope But Consensus on Problens, Fixes Elusive, BNA REP.
FOR EXECUrrmvEs, Mar. 18, 1999.
74 See Draft Strategic Plan, supra note 67, at 10.
75 See id.
76 The first step of this specific implementation created
two new bureaus, the Enforcement Bureau and the Con-
sumer Information Bureau to consolidate agency functions.
In the second phase, the Commission plans to consolidate
the functions of policy/rulemaking and also service/licens-
ing across the agency to ultimately form a Licensing Bureau
and a Competition/Policy Bureau. See id.
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to restructure. 7 7 By 2001, it will choose one bu-
reau that is centered on a specific platform of de-
livery, such as the Cable Bureau, and restructure
it along functional lines. 78 Thus, the Commission
recognizes that its current organizational struc-
ture based on underlying transmission medium is
not well suited for a converged environment. The
Commission, therefore, is actively working to ad-
dress this problem through major reorganization.
Changing the organizational structure will help,
but the FCC must still operate within its statutory
framework as established by Congress.
D. Carrier and Service Classifications for the
Future
The existing statutory framework assumes only
a certain service is provided over a given transmis-
sion medium. This system is already becoming
outmoded. 79 It appears that convergence is forc-
ing government to rethink these schemes. The
FCC, per Congress' mandate, recently considered
definitions of several classifications of carriers and
services.8 0 Convergence has created a number of
difficult issues for the FCC; the most recent issues
have been IP telephony8 l and ISP issues.8 2 Both of
these disputes entail regulating converged ser-
vices and entities with traditional regulatory classi-
fications of a service tied to a specific transmission
77 See id.
78 See id. at 11. The specific example of combining the
mass media functions of the cable and mass media bureaus
to create a media competition bureau was outlined in the
draft plan. See id.
79 See Reilly, supra note 24, at 114 (noting that the entire
communications industry is undergoing change and so will
the regulations).
80 See discussion supra Part II.B.
81 IP telephony is the provision of a voice service carried
over a network based on the internet protocol. See In re Im-
plementation of Sections 255 and 251 (a) (2) of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934, as Enacted by the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, WT Docket No. 96-198, Report And Order and Fur-
ther Notice Of Inquiry, at para. 177 (Sept. 29, 1999) (stating
internet protocol telephony ("internet" or "IP" telephony)
services enable real-time voice transmission using the in-
ternet protocol, a packet-switched communications proto-
col). IP services can be provided in two basic ways: computer-
to-computer IP telephony conducted through special
software and hardware at an end user's premises; or phone-
to-phone IP telephony conducted through "gateways" that
enable applications originating and/or terminating on the
public switched network. Phone-to-phone IP telephony is
provided through computer gateways that allow end users to
make and receive calls using their traditional telephones.
Gateways translate the circuit-switched voice signal into IP
packets, and vice versa, and perform associated signaling,
medium. A future regulatory approach may be
one that takes a more consistent view of regula-
tion, separating service from transmission me-
dium. However, modifying the statutory under-
pinnings of communications regulation will be a
time-consuming process"" and in the interim pe-
riod, converged technologies and companies that
do not fit into the current regulatory framework
must be addressed in some way. It is the proposi-
tion of this comment that this problem can be
solved by using the FCC's broad public interest
standard to develop merger conditions that ad-
dress converged technologies and companies that
do not fit into the current regulatory scheme.
IV. MERGER REVIEW
A. General
This paper focuses on the effects of mergers
across different sectors of the communications in-
dustry. Mergers such as this are classified as "hori-
zontal" or "conglomerate" mergers. Horizontal
mergers are defined as "between companies per-
forming similar functions in the production or
sale of comparable goods or services" and are
thought to present the greatest threat to competi-
tion in a market.8 4 An example of this type of
merger would be a cable distribution company
control and address translation functions. The voice commu-
nications can then be transmitted along with other data on
the "public" internet, or can be routed through intranets or
other private data networks for improved performance. See
id.
82 ISPs are currently exempt from paying LECs, such as
Bell Atlantic, access charges, which long-distance carriers
have traditionally paid LECs to transfer their traffic onto the
LECs local loop networks. See In re Access Charge Reform;
Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers;
Transport Rate Structure and Pricing; End User Common
Line Charges, First Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 15982
(1997). Also, note that a House of Representatives bill, the
Internet Access Charge Prohibition Act, would prevent the
FCC from imposing access charges on ISPs. See the Internet
Access Charge Prohibition Act of 2000, H.R. 1291. See also
Derrick Cain, House Passes Legislation Blocking FCC from Impos-
ing Fees on Internet Access, BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES,
No. 96, A-38, Mar. 17, 2000.
8-3 See Reilly, supra note 24, at 110 (stating "it is nearly
impossible to create a long-term, stable, regulatory environ-
ment when revolutionary technology and market merger
frenzy make it 'almost impossible to totally update the policy
framework in one sweeping effort"') (quoting COMM. DAILY,
Jan. 5, 1994, at 5).
84 John W. Berresford, Mergers in Mobile Telecommunica-
tions Services: A Primer on the Analysis of Their Competitive Effects,
48 FED. COMM. L.J. 247, 281 (1996) (quoting Brown Shoe
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merging with a satellite television company. Con-
glomerate mergers are defined as between two
companies with unrelated products.8 5 For exam-
ple, Microsoft merging with AT&T would be a
conglomerate merger, because the companies
have unrelated products and services. Under anti-
trust review, this merger is generally viewed as
posing no competitive threat. However, as sectors
within the communications industry continue to
blur, previously unrealized threats to competition
may be seen in conglomerate mergers. One such
merger that will be considered in this paper is the
pending AOL-Time Warner merger. With these
points in mind, it is helpful to review the FCC's
authority to review mergers, its standard of review
and its analytical framework in order to under-
stand how the FCC is capable of using merger
conditions as an interim regulatory tool to deal
with converged services that do not fit the current
regulatory framework.
B. Authority to Review Mergers86
The FCC has jurisdiction to review mergers in-
Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962)) [herein-
after Berresford].
85 See id. at 282.
86 It should be noted that four bills on FCC merger re-
view authority have been introduced in this Congress to date,
with the general effect of limiting the FCC's merger review
authority substantively or through imposition of time limits.
See Antitrust Merger Review Act, S. 467, 106th Cong. (1999);
Telecommunications Merger Review Act, S. 1125, 106th
Cong. (1999); Fairness in Telecommunications License
Transfers Act of 1999, H.R. 2533, 106th Cong. (1999); To
Amend the Communications Act of 1934 to Establish Time
Limits for Federal Communications Commission Review of
Merger, Acquisitions and Other License Transfers, H.R.
2783, 106th Cong. (1999).
87 See Harvey I. Saferstein & David R. Boyko, Antitrust Is-
sues for Telecom Mergers and Acquisitions, PLI CORPORATE LAW
AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. BO-00A9, at 71,
75 (1999) [hereinafter Saferstein & Boyko].
88 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 18, 21(a) (1998). This concurrentjuris-
diction is shared with the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission. See id.
89 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (1998). Section 214(a)
gives the FCC authority over the application for acquisition
or transfer of lines by common carriers, while Section 310(d)
gives the FCC authority over transfer of construction permits
or station licenses. See id.
90 15 U.S.C. § 21(b).
91 47 U.S.C. § 214(c), 303(r). Section 214(c) allows the
FCC to attach "such terms and conditions as in its judgment
the public convenience and necessity may require," while sec-
tion 303(r) allows the FCC to prescribe "conditions . . .as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." Id.
92 See Communications Act of 1934, §§ 214(a) and
volving radio license transfers or common carri-
ers8 7 under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Sec-
tions 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act,88 and Sections
214(a) and 310(d) of the Communications Act.8 9
It has authority to condition mergers through
consent decrees under the Clayton Act,9 0 or
under Sections 214(c) and 303(r) of the Commu-
nications Act. 91 The merging parties mandatory
applications for transfer and control of licenses
and authorizations trigger the FCC's review, 92 and
it is the applicants' burden to prove that the
merger is in the public interest.93 It is significant
to note that the conditions are "voluntary" condi-
tions agreed to by the applicants, so once ac-
cepted, it is unlikely that a court will entertain a
challenge by the applicants.9 4 Also, the FCC can
block a merger9 5 with its own authority, which
would receive substantial judicial deference in a
court challenge. 9 6 Thus, by the nature of its au-
thority, FCC merger conditions can be used as ef-
fective and powerful regulatory tools.
310(d) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d)); see also
Saferstein & Boyko, supra note 87, at 78.
93 See In re Applications of NYNEX Corporation Trans-
feror, and Bell Atlantic Corporation Transferee, for Consent
to Transfer Control of NYNEX Corporation and Its Subsidi-
aries, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985, 20000-20001 para. 29 (1997) [here-
inafter BA-NYNEX Order]; see also Rachelle B. Chong, Study
Materials on Regulatory Dynamics in the Telecommunications In-
dustry, PLI CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE HANDBOOK SERIES
No. BO-00A9, at 61, 66.(1999) [hereinafter Chong].
94 See Senkowski, Mergers and Acquisitions: What are the FCC
Issues?, 1060 PLI CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE HANDBOOK
SERIES No. BO-0079, at 125, 139 (1998) [hereinafter Senkow-
ski].
95 The FCC would technically be blocking the transfer of
licenses and authorizations underlying the merger. See 47
U.S.C. §§ 214(a), (c), 310(d). Section 214(a) states that
"[n]o carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line
or ... shall acquire or operate any line . . . until there shall
first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate."
Section 214(c) states that "[t]he Commission shall have
power to issue such certificate as applied for, to refuse to is-
sue it." Section 310(d) states that "[nlo construction permit
or station license ... shall be transferred, assigned ... except
upon application to the Commission."
96 The FCC's decision would be subject to a highly defer-
ential arbitrary and capricious review standard under 5
U.S.C. § 706(2) (A), where the court generally will not substi-
tute its judgment for that of the agency's. Note that under
antitrust authority, the DOJ/FTC must bring judicial suit and
prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence in order
to block a merger, placing the burden on the government
rather than the applicants. See Telecommunications Merger Act of
2000, Hearing before the Subcomm. -on Telecommunications Trade
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C. The Public Interest Standard of Review
Although the FCC has jurisdiction to review
mergers for anti-competitive effects using anti-
trust analysis under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
and sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act,9 7 the
FCC has declined to use this authority and instead
conducts its review under the broader mandate
and authority of its public interest standard, 8
which involves traditional antitrust analysis for
anti-competitive effects as well as the public inter-
est standard of the Communications Act.19
The FCC must affirmatively find a merger to
"serve the public interest, convenience and neces-
sity."' 00 The public interest standard is broad and
flexible and includes consideration of whether
the merger is consistent with the goals of the
Communications Act, Commission rules and fed-
eral communications policy."" Some considera-
tions are the goals of the Communications Act,11 2
such as fostering a competitive and deregulatory
environment,"13 maintenance and growth of a
universal service program,"14 and timely deploy-
ment of advanced communications services." 5
Applicants bear a positive burden of proving not
just that the merger is not anti-competitive, but
that it is "pro-competitive."' 10 Also, the Commis-
sion may consider industry trends and needs, fac-
tors behind Congress enacting specific provisions,
and the "complexity and rapidity of change in the
industry."107
and Consumer Protection, 106th Cong. (Mar. 14, 2000) (testi-
mony of FCC Conm'r Powell) [hereinafter Testimony of
Comm'r Powell].
97 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 18. Here, the FCC shares concurrent
jurisdiction with the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission, except that the F7TC does not have au-
thority to review common carrier transactions. See Saferstein
& Boyko, supra note 87, at 75. Although the FCC's review is
independent of the DOJ/FTC review, it must give "substan-
tial weight" to the DOI's comments. See id. at 78; see also 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 18. The Sherman Act makes mergers resulting
"in restraint of trade or commerce" illegal. Id. at § 1. The
Clayton Act proactively bars mergers that act to "substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." Id. at
§ 7.
98 See BA-NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20008, para. 29.
See also, Saferstein & Boyko, supra note 87, at 77; Berresford,
supra note 84, at n.6; Chong, supra note 93, at 66.
99 See BA-NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20008, para. 29;
Senkowski, supra note 94, at 132. Also, the FCC's review is
open to the public and is based on the public record, plead-
ings and comments rather than independent fact-finding, as
in the DOJ analysis. See Saferstein & Boyko, supra note 87, at
78.
ll Friedich, supra note 20, at 261.
l1 See BA-NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20009, para. 32.
Thus, the FCC has the broad power to consider
all effects of a possible merger to ensure the
merger will create results that are generally in the
public interest and may condition the merger to
ensure this result. In particular, the considera-
tions of industry needs and trends and the com-
plexity and rapidity of change within the industry
allows the Commission to take into consideration
the rapid deployment of services and technology
that do not fit well, or are not considered in the
current regulatory scheme. This gives the FCC
leeway to construct conditions for converged ser-
vices that are not a factor in antitrust analysis and
are ill fitted to the current regulatory scheme. It
should be noted that, although the public interest
standard is broad, it is not a source of unre-
strained discretion. Therefore, it should be used
in a predictable and transparent way to address
valid concerns. 10 8
D. Merger Review Framework
Since the FCC considers competitive effects,
the structure of its review is similar to that of the
FTC and DOJ, which is based on competitive ef-
fects and analysis of market power, antitrust laws
and the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines.'0 9 First, the relevant markets are defined in
terms of the product, 110 scope and geographic'1 I
For a full discussion of the considerations of and develop-
ment of the FCC's public interest standard, see generally,
Friedrich, supra note 20.
102 See Saferstein & Boyko, supra note 87, at 77.
103 See 1996 Act, at preamble (describing "[a]n Act to
promote competition and reduce regulation"); see also BA-
NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20002-03, para. 31.
i4 See Saferstein & Boyko, supra note 87, at 77; see
Chong, supra note 93, at 65.
1115 See 1996 Act at § 706(a) (stating the "[t]he Commis-
sion.., shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans").
106 See Friedich, supra note 20, at 262.; see also Senkowski,
supra note 94, at 133.
107 BA-NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20004, para. 32.
"I" See infra, text at section VI.D. See also Friedrich, supra
note 20, at 263 (noting the public interest standard is "not
without its limits" and must be used "to advance a legitimate
communications policy objective").
"It' See Chong, supra note 93, at 67. See also BA-NYNEX
Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20008, para. 37.
1 10 The term product also includes services delivered by
a company. A product market is the market for a company's
product, and in addition, the products that are reasonably
interchangeable with it. The FCC does not have its own defi-
[Vol. 8
Interim Regulatory Approach
area. 11 2 Second, the market participants-actual
competitors or likely entrants-are identified.' 3
Third, these markets are examined to determine
the competitive effects of the merger, focusing on
possible exercise of increased market power
through unilateral or coordinated anti-competi-
tive behavior.'l 4 The pre-merger and post-merger
degree of concentration in the relevant market
(or markets) is determined by calculating the
market share of each company by using objective
measurements, such as revenue share or the num-
ber of customers within a market.' ' 5 A merger
that leaves a market overly concentrated or that
sharply increases the level of concentration re-
ceives close scrutiny because the likelihood of
anti-competitive effects is great. 116 The examina-
tion considers anti-competitive effects such as in-
creased price, or decreased quality or availability;
and pro-competitive effects, such as, reduction of
a dominant firm's market power or prevention of
coordinated anti-competitive actions.' ' 7 Lastly,
the harmful effects are balanced against existing
mediating conditions, such as ease of entry of a
competitor; and against positive effects of the
merger, such as increased efficiencies resulting in
decreased cost, increased productivity or in-
creased innovation.I" It is notable that beneficial
effects need not directly counteract the harmful
effects to be considered as offsetting the harmful
effects, so long as the merger is in the public in-
nition of product market and is not bound to use one test in
particular, but in practice has always used the Supreme
Court's reasonable interchangeability test. See Berresford,
supra note 84, at 254 (citing examples). The test looks to
whether products are "reasonably interchangeable by con-
sumers for the same purposes." Berresford, supra note 84, at
253 (citing United States v. E. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956)).
111 A geographic market is the "area of effective competi-
tion" where consumers have sources for a particular product,
or where competition from other sellers holds down prices.
See Berresford, supra note 84, at 275 (quoting Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 359).
112 See BA-NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20008-09, para.
37; Chong, supra note 93, at 68; Senkowski, supra note 94, at
134; Berresford, supra note 84, at 250.
1 1- See BA-NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20008, para. 37;
see also Chong, supra note 93, at 68; Senkowski, supra note 94,
at 134.
''4 See BA-NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20008-09, para.
37. See also Chong, supra note 93, at 68; Senkowski, supra note
94, at 134.
115 See Berresford, supra note 84, at 283. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index ("HHI") typically measures the degree of
concentration in the relevant market. The HHI is calculated
by determining the pre-merger market share of each relevant
terest overall. If a negative effect on competition
is found, action may be taken to halt the merger,
but more commonly, the merger is condi-
tioned. 1 9 Generally, these conditions can be clas-
sified as behavioral (requirements to deal with a
merging partner's competitors or reporting re-
quirements) or structural (divestitures to lower
market share or separate subsidiary require-
ments). 120 Behavioral requirements are obviously
more burdensome on an agency because the par-
ties' compliance must be monitored, and non-
compliance must be addressed. Structural condi-
tions, however, heavily impact the involved
companies, which might be reluctant to agree to
such onerous conditions. This requires a delicate
balance of the type of conditions imposed and the
extent of each condition's reach.
V. EXAMPLES OF MERGER CONDITIONING
A. SBC-Ameritech
Several conditions of the SBC-Ameritech
merger concerned the provisioning of advanced
services, such as DSL. One condition required
SBC-Ameritech to provide any advanced services
through a separate affiliate, even within a local ac-
cess and transport area ("LATA").12' Another
condition required SBC-Ameritech to provide
"surrogate" line sharing charges, where it leased
competitor, (measured by numbers of current customers, re-
cently added customers, gross revenues, net revenues or
amount of product placed in the market within the year)
squaring each market share, then summing all squared mar-
ket shares. The same is then done for post-merger market
shares and the two sums are compared, indicating the
change in market concentration due to the merger. See id. at
283-85.
1 16 The Horizontal Guidelines provide numeric bench-
mark post-merger HHI values of 1000, 1000-1800 and over
1800, respectively, indicating an unconcentrated market, a
moderately concentrated market or a highly concentrated
market. See id. at 283.
117 See Senkowski, supra note 94, at 134.
118 See BA-NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20009, para. 37;
see also, Senkowski, supra note 94, at 135.
119 See Berresford, supra note 84, at 304.
120 See id.
121 See In re Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor,
and SBC Communications Inc., Transferee, 14 FCC Rcd.
14,712, 14,969-90, app. C 2-22 (1999) [hereinafter SBC-Amer-
itech Order]. A LATA is a local access transport area, and
BOCs are required by § 272 of the Communications Act of
1934 to provide interLATA services through a separate affili-
ate. See 47 U.S.C. § 272(a).
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"part" of the line to competitors for the provision
of advanced service, charging less than the price
for an entire line, although the rest of line was
not used.122 Four other conditions 12 3 were ap-
plied to advanced services to ensure competitors
could offer advanced services over SBC-Amer-
itech's separate affiliates under nondiscriminatory
terms. 124
In the SBC-Ameritech Order, the Commission has
chosen to condition a converged service, broad-
band internet, with a traditional regulatory mind-
set, based on the underlying transmission me-
dium, rather than make the same services carry
the same burdens regardless of the underlying
transmission medium. The decision typifies the
traditional regulatory mindset that services pro-
vided over a common carrier network should be
regulated. The same services provided over a dif-
ferent network, such as wireless or cable, would
not be regulated because services provided over
those facilities historically have not carried the
same level of regulation. 25 This decision can be
contrasted to the AT&T-TCI decision discussed
below at Part B, where the Commission chose not
to condition broadband internet delivered over
cable.
B. AT&T-TCI
Here, the FCC's review focused on the likeli-
hood that the new company would provide a local
telephony alternative, and on the danger that the
combination would lessen cellular service compe-
tition because TCI owned Sprint PCS tracking
122 See SBC-Ameritech Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 14,990-92,
app. C 23-25.
123 These conditions include: 1) development and de-
ployment of electronic operational support systems ("OSS")
interfaces for competitors to pre-order and order facilities
needed to provide advanced services, and a 25% discount on
unbundled loops for advanced services until such interfaces
are employed; 2) access to advanced services loop informa-
tion for unaffiliated carriers to obtain information to market
advanced services; 3) mandatory filings of cost studies and
proposed rates for conditioning loops for provisioning of ad-
vanced services in accordance with FCC UNE pricing rules
formulas; 4) at least 10% of DSL deployment in rural or ur-
ban wire centers will be from low-income rural or urban wire
centers after DSL has been deployed in 20 rural or urban
wire centers, respectively. See id. at para. 371-76.
124 See id.
125 See discussion supra Part Ill.
126 See In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of
Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from
Tele-Commnicaitons, Inc., Transferor to AT&T Corp., Trans-
stock, a competitor to AT&T's wireless service.126
The transfer was granted on the condition that
TCI transfer its Sprint tracking stock to an FCC-
approved trust, and that any economic benefit
from that stock be directed to shareholders in
Liberty Media Group, a TCI entity.1 27
The AT&T-TCI merger represents what might
be traditionally classified as a conglomerate
merger 28 that does not pose a competitive threat
because it is a combination of two companies
whose primary products are unrelated-long-dis-
tance telephone service, and cable programming
and delivery.' 29 However, the Commission is to
consider industry trends and needs, and the
"complexity and rapidity of change in the indus-
try" within its merger review.' 30 Thus, it should
consider how these cable lines might be used in
the future and what control of these lines, with
their likely attendant uses, will mean to the overall
communications industry. In the AT&T-TCI Or-
der, the Commission considered use of the lines
for two convergent services-provision of cable
internet service and provision of local telephony
service" 3I-but did not impose any conditions. 132
It found that use of these lines for internet service
should not necessitate any attendant conditions,
such as a requirement to make the lines accessible
to all ISPs-widely known as the cable open access
issue.' -33 Although this was considered a non-
merger specific issue, 13 4 imposing a condition to
effect open cable access would have been a way to
exact parity between broadband internet over
cable and over telephone lines, Digital Subscriber
Lines ("DSL"), without going through the lengthy
feree, 14 FCC Rcd. 3160 (1999) [hereinafter AT&T-TCI Or-
der).
127 See id. at 3161, para. 1.
128 See discussion supra Part IV, A.
129 Note that a merger may be conglomerate in some as-
pects, but horizontal in others.
13" BA-NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20003, para. 32.
'3' See AT&T-TCI Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 3183, paras.
44-96.
132 See id. at 3161, para. I.
133 See id. at 3207, para. 96. Before the AOL-Time
Warner merger was announced, AOL Senior Vice President
George Vradenberg, Ill noted the inconsistency of cable
open access requirements being labeled as internet regula-
tion that goes against current FCC policy, though the phone
system has been tinder such regulation for years. See David
Kaut, Powell Says Question is How, Not Whether, to Regulate, as
'Worlds' Collide on Internet, BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECurIVES,
Oct. 8, 1999.
1-4 See AT&T-TCI Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 3161, para. 96.
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rulemaking process. A condition is also waived
more easily than changing or repealing a rule, so
that if the condition had undesirable effects, it
could be readily removed. The Commission fur-
ther found that use of cable lines for provision of
local telephony service would affect public benefit
by creating competition with the incumbent local
exchange carriers ("ILECs"), therefore, there
should be no conditions related to this use.'135 By
forgoing conditioning of these services, the Com-
mission missed an opportunity to establish, or at
least test, a method of regulating these converged
services that do not fit the current regulatory
scheme. Thus, there remains uncertainty as to
whether cable telephony will be regulated differ-
ently than telephony provided by common carri-
ers over the public switched telephone network
("PSTN"), and the provision of internet service
will continue to be regulated differently for ILECs
than for others.13 6
It also seems that the Commission did not con-
sider what it means for one company to have con-
trol over a combined network capable of deliver-
ing local telephony, long-distance telephony,
internet service and television programming, with
a national footprint in all markets. This combina-
tion of services across traditional industry markets
is the hallmark of the converged company in this
new era of convergence and consolidation. What
are the competitive effects of such a combination?
Antitrust analysis does not consider such ramifica-
tions, but the FCC public interest standard could.
In the short term, allowing the converged services
of this merger to go without conditions may cre-
ate competition in the local telephony market or
promote delivery of advanced services (broad-
band internet) to all Americans. But, the long-
term effects of having such a large company con-
trol such a significant market share for multiple
services nationwide, may stifle other competitors
135 See id. at 3187, paras. 51-59 (noting especially para.
51 where commenters suggested that the Commission should
impose conditions similar to those of an incumbent local ex-
change carrier under its § 310(d) authority).
136 FCC Chairman Kennard has noted that the current
statutory structure "did not fully anticipate the convergence
of phone and cable high-speed systems" and that "local
phone companies are subject to requirements that cable has
avoided." David Kaut, Kennard Says FCC Has Power to Impose
Cable ISP-Access Duties, But Remains Wary, BNA DALv REP. FOR
EXECUTIV S, May 20, 1999 [hereinafter Kaut].
137 The CEO WinStar, Rouhana, remarked on the pend-
ing MCI WorldCom-Sprint merger, expressing concern that
in any of the involved markets through bundling
of services, increased customer base, and in-
creased economies of scope and scale against
which smaller companies cannot compete. 3 7
C. AOL-Time Warner
The pending AOL-Time Warner merger
presents another conglomerate merger-an ISP
merging with a programming developer and dis-
tributor that is the second largest owner of cable
facilities. Like the AT&T-TCI merger, this merger
involves the use of a cable network to deliver
broadband internet service and gives the FCC an-
other chance to regulate this converged service. It
is unlikely, however, that the FCC will impose any
conditions on this service. It did not do so in the
AT&T-TCI merger 138 and the Commission is satis-
fied with AOL and Time Warner's assurance that
their broadband cable networks will be open to
competitive ISPs.' 39 After passing AT&T-TCI's
merger without requiring open cable access, 140 it
would be very inconsistent to require it in the
AOL-Time Warner merger. It would be more con-
sistent to waive the condition it imposed in the
SBC-Ameritech merger, requiring the company to
lease its enhanced lines at a "surrogate" line-shar-
ing rate' 4 ' to competitors for advanced services
delivery. This would create parity in the regula-
tion of broadband internet delivery over cable
and over copper wire (telephone lines), while
achieving the deregulatory goal of the Commis-
sion.
As in the AT&T-TCI merger, one company will
gain control over combined services and networks
that span across industry sectors nationwide.
Again, the Commission should consider what it
means for one company to have control over na-
tionwide programming, program delivery, print
and internet content, and internet service and
industry consolidation may be reaching a point where
smaller competitors would be in danger because there is a
size where "ability to dominate with brand and pricing be-
comes overwhelming for all others." Kaut, supra note 133.
138 See discussion supra Part V.B.
139 See Statement of Chairman William E. Kennard on
the Memorandum of Understanding Between America On-
line and Time Warner Regarding Non-Discriminatory Access
for ISPs to its Cable Networks, FCC NEws, Feb. 29, 2000, (vis-
ited Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.fcc.gov/speeches/Kennard/
statements/2000/stwek016.html>.
140 See discussion supra Part V.B.
141 See discussion supra Part V.A.
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networks. Effects of having a mega-company with
vast market share for multiple services nationwide
may inhibit competitors in any of the involved
markets through the use of bundling of services,
increased customer base, and increased econo-
mies of scope and scale.
VI. MERGER CONDITIONS AS A
REGULATORY TOOL
A. Significant Impact
Although merger conditions apply only to the
two companies merging, the impact is significant.
Behavioral merger conditions may directly affect
how the merged company must deal with compet-
itors. 14 2 Structural conditions may alter the
merged company's position in an industry sec-
tor 143 or change how the company can operate.
Additionally, the large size of companies merging
today means that the merger conditions will im-
pact the workings of one of the largest partici-
pants in a market, which would necessarily have a
notable impact on other companies' participation
in a market. Also, the number of companies
merging today indicates that more merger condi-
tions are almost certain to follow, so that new con-
ditions will continue to affect the evolving com-
munications industry. Lastly, mergers happening
today impact the outcome of mergers in the im-
mediate future. 144 Thus, merger conditions affect
the whole industry by directly influencing the
merged company's behavior or structure, and
through future merger conditions on other merg-
ing companies. As seen in the section below, these
conditions do impact the industry as a whole, yet
they are more tailored and effective than general
142 See generally BA-NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985
(mandating certain performance standards for network per-
formance and OSS, as well as interconnection pricing and
unbundled network elements).
143 See generally In. re Application of WorldCom, Inc. and
MCI Communications Corp. for Transfer of Control of MCI
Communications Corp. to WorldCom, Inc., 13 FCC Rcd.
18025 (1998) (ordering divestiture of certain internet back-
bone assets) [hereinafter MCI-WorldCom Order].
144 A good example of this impact is the case of the
blocked MCI WorldCom-Sprint merger on the heels of the
MCI-WorldCom merger. Here the MCI-WorldCom merger
resulted in higher levels of concentration in the long-dis-
tance telephony market and FCC Chairman Kennard said ap-
proval of the subsequent MCI WorldCom-Sprint merger
would be a "surrender." See Statement of FCC Chairman Ken-
nard on Proposed Merger of MCI WorldCom, Inc. and
Sprint Corp., FCC NEWS, Oct. 5, 1999. The DOJ was said to
regulation because they are developed for and ap-
plied to only the merging parties.
B. Less Regulatory, More Precise
The Commission is faced with regulation in an
era of tremendous change, yet the 1996 Act
charges the FCC with a duty to reduce regula-
tion. 45 Thus, the FCC faces the challenge of deal-
ing with convergent technology that does not fit
the current regulatory structure, while also creat-
ing a deregulatory environment. Promulgating
new rules to deal with new technology is onerous,
may stifle investment and innovation, and is con-
trary to its deregulatory mandate. Merger condi-
tions, however, provide a viable alternative to
rulemaking for convergent technologies and com-
panies.
By using merger conditions, the Commission
could affect more appropriate controls over con-
verged companies and technologies that are not
conducive to regulation under the current
scheme. Note that this method would pertain only
to the parties involved in the merger and their
products or services. The terms would not be ap-
plicable to all companies throughout the industry.
Thus, the "regulation" would be much more lim-
ited in application than a rulemaking, which
would apply to every company in the industry.
In addition, these terms are tailored to a spe-
cific set of conditions. The Commission does not
have to foresee how the terms would play out in
every set of circumstances with different compa-
nies at different instances in the future-a diffi-
cult task in such a rapidly changing environ-
ment.14" Thus, the terms are necessarily more
have sought an injunction to block the MCI WorldCom-
Sprint merger in part due to the difficulties with the internet
backbone divestiture condition of the MCI-WorldCom
merger that resulted in a court case and eventual settlement
between companies. See David Kaut, Analyst Expects MCI
WorldCom-Sprint Deal to Be Blocked by DOJ; Companies Confident,
BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Mar. 16, 2000. The FCC
also explicitly reiterates this principle in its BA-NYNEX Order
when it states that future applicants "bear an additional bur-
den" in proving their merger will be in the public interest
because the present merger reduced the number of incum-
bent local exchange carriers. BA-NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd.
at 19994, para. 16.
145 See 1996 Act, supra note 17, at preamble.
146 FCC Chairman Kennard described the use of the
public interest test for merger conditions as follows:
on a case-by-case basis ... [the public interest standard]
is more efficient, and much less regulatory, than writing
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precise and less likely to retard innovation and in-
vestment.
C. More Efficient
The communications sector is experiencing
rapid technological advances and convergence, as
well as unprecedented consolidation, but the
FCC's public notice and comment rulemaking
process is lengthy and can be cumbersome.
Under the terms of the Communications Act, the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Commis-
sion's rules, there are certain timelines that can-
not be shortened, due to time allowances for pub-
lic notice and comment. Furthermore,
rulemaking is often challenged under judicial re-
view, lengthening the process even more. Al-
though this process has ensured the public safe-
guards and a voice, it can be too lengthy to deal
with new technologies when subsequent techno-
logical advances may outdate the newly estab-
lished rule or at least necessitate modification.
Merger conditions, however, bypass this delay.
Since merger conditions are not rules that apply
generally to all companies in the industry, they
are not submitted to the same notice and com-
ment rulemaking process. The FCC has to deal
only with the merging parties in negotiating an
agreement, and merger conditions are essentially
a contract between the merging parties and the
FCC. As such, it is unlikely that a court would en-
tertain an appeal from one of the parties upon
accepting the grant for transfers of licenses and
authorizations for the merger. 147 Although inter-
ested parties may challenge the merger in
court, 1 4 8 no parties have done so to date. 149 Inter-
extensive rules attempting to anticipate every way in
which any possible transaction might violate any part of
the Communication's Act or the FCC's rules ... [the
public interest] meaning is inherently fact specific. This
is particularly true in rapidly changing times. Accord-
ingly, case-by-case analysis is often superior to writing
volumes of rules attempting to explain the application of
a legal standard to every conceivable fact pattern. -
Mergers in the Telecommunications Industy, Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. (Nov. 8, 1999) (state-
ment of FCC Chairman Kennard).
147 See Senkowski, supra note 94, at 139. The merging
parties cannot accept this grant unless it accepts the condi-
tions to the grant and cannot appeal if it accepts the grant.
See id.
148 See id. (referencing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)). The FCC
final orders are subject to judicial review under the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard, but review is deferential to the
agency's decision. See id.
ested parties may also file comments, but it is
likely that fewer parties will want to comment if
the terms negotiated are not applied industry-
wide and only to the merging parties. There also
is the added consideration that it is in the 'merg-
ing parties interest to negotiate toward an agree-
ment as quickly as possible in order to reap the
benefits of the pending merger. 50 Thus, the FCC
is able to work outside the notice and comment
rulemaking process in a shorter process with fac-
tors pushing toward an agreement, rather than
against an agreement, as may be the case in a
rulemaking where it is difficult to resolve the con-
cerns of many diverse interests.
D. A Fair Hand: Predictability, Transparency,
and Reasonable Nexus to Legitimate and
Clearly Identified Harmful Effect
With the benefits of regulation through merger
conditioning stated, let it be said that this com-
ment does not advocate unduly burdening
merger applicants with an FCC policy wish list of
conditions. Review under the public interest stan-
dard gives the FCC broad power that must be
used with deliberate and reasoned decisions to at-
tach conditions. If the FCC does use merger con-
ditions as an interim tool to cope with converged
services and technologies that do not fit the cur-
rent regulatory scheme, it must do so in such a
way that there is predictability in conditions from
one merger to the next and transparency
throughout the process, resulting in conditions
with a reasonable nexus to a legitimate and clearly
identified harm. 1 5 1 Such a step is desirable and
important if merger conditions are to be used as a
149 The author has found no judicial challenges to FCC
merger conditions after searching for court documentation,
news articles and scholarly pieces on Westlaw, Lexis and Pike
and Fischer databases.
150 Recall also, that it is the merging parties responsibil-
ity to show that the merger is in the public interest. See discus-
sion supra Part IV.B.
151 The FCC has recently formed a new intra-agency
merger team to make the merger review process more effi-
cient and coordinate review across the bureaus. Although the
initiative is procedural and does not affect the substantive re-
view of mergers, it is notable that a primary goal is to make
the review more predictable and transparent by explaining
the public interest test with written guidelines and utilizing
the specialized skills of staff involved in merger reviews to en-
sure consistency between decisions. See Mergers in the Telecom-
munications Industry, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 106th Cong. (Nov. 8, 1999) (statement of FCC
Chairman Kennard).
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regulatory tool. Speed of approval, predictability,
transparency and consistency in reviews will make
the process less risky in terms of business plans,
creating an environment of certainty that fosters
innovative business plans and technologies. In an
industry as large and far-reaching as the commu-
nications industry, failed mergers or mergers with
initially unanticipated conditions may lead to a
good deal of monetary loss or loss of market
strength for the companies, and have some im-
pact on the industry as a whole.
Predictable merger conditions, or at least
known analytical factors that are applied consist-
ently to each merger, would go a long way toward
making sound business decisions and sound pol-
icy decisions. Currently, merger reviews are con-
ducted under the public interest standard, an
evolving standard developed on a case-by-case ba-
sis, by its nature lacking consistent guiding princi-
ples.' 52 In addition, the FCC uses a balancing ap-
proach where it can find a merger is in the public
interest if the total benefits (including condi-
tions) outweigh the total harms, regardless of
whether the benefits actually mitigate the
harms-or even relate to them. 15 3 This makes
conditions less predictable. One solution would
be to issue a set of guidelines like the DOJ/FTC
did with their 1992 Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines.15 4 By issuing such guidelines and acting
consistently within them, within reason, the Com-
mission could establish a very predictable merger
review. This would give companies a way to fairly
anticipate and prepare for possible outcomes of
the merger review, and it may increase the effi-
ciency with which the Commission conducts the
review by limiting factors considered. Finally, it
152 See Testimony of Comm'r Powell, supra note 96 (not-
ing that the public interest standard lacks guiding principles
that would lend predictability to Commission decisions).
153 See id. (noting that the public interest standard does
not require that conditions cure or remedy identified harms,
just that they outweigh them).
154 Note that Comm'r Powell suggests something akin to
FCC merger guidelines, calling for the Commission to out-
line basic principles it uses in applying the public interest
standard in order to achieve predictable, reasoned applica-
tions of the standard and guard against subjective condition-
ing. See MCI-WorldCom Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 18165-66 (sepa-
rate statement of Comm'r Powell).
155 It is notable that there is a Commission initiative to
streamline the merger review process to speed review of
mergers by making review more procedurally efficient and
coordinated across bureaus. The initiative recognizes the
need to address merger reviews more quickly in light of the
increase in number, size and complexity of mergers. It aims
may well lend the Commission's decisions more
credibility.
The merger review process should also be trans-
parent, with the involved parties knowing where
they stand in the process and what is expected at
the next step.' 55 With the burden on the appli-
cants to prove that the merger is in the public in-
terest, without guidelines, it may be a guessing
game for applicants to decide on the next step or
come up with an agreeable offering. The FCC also
has been criticized for holding secret meetings
during the merger review process.' 56 It would be
burdensome on both the companies involved and
the FCC's efficiency to have merger condition ne-
gotiations open to the entire Commission or the
public, but some transparency may be achievable
without hindering the process,. It may be too
much to shift the burden of proving the merger is
not in the public interest to the FCC. This would
make the process much more cumbersome and
intensive if the FCC had to build a case against a
merger. However, the issuance of an FCC advisory
statement to the parties at key points in the review
with specific findings and considerations for reso-
lution may make the process more transparent.
Thus, some amount of transparency can be
achieved without hindering the process to the ex-
tent of notice and comment rulemaking.
Lastly, the conditions themselves should be rea-
sonably anticipated. One suggestion is to adhere
to a standard of merger conditions having a rea-
sonable nexus to a legitimate and clearly identi-
fied harmful effect of the merger. ,57 This would
enable the applicants to fairly anticipate what con-
ditions they might expect and ensure that the
Commission does not trade off a harmful effect
to keep merger reviews to a 180-day timeline and make inter-
nal procedures uniform and transparent across the Commis-
sion with a consistent public interest analysis. Although this is
a procedural reform and will not change the substantive re-
view, the goals of developing uniform and transparent inter-
nal procedures and a consistent public interest analysis will
make the FCC's merger review process more streamlined. See
FCC Implements Predictable, Transparent and Streamlined
Merger Review Process, FCC NEws, Jan. 12, 2000 (visited Apr.
9, 2000) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OGC/News_Re-
leases/2000/nrgeOOO1.html>.
156 See Telecommunications Merger Act of 2000, Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications Trade and Consumer Protec-
tion, 106th Cong. (Mar. 14, 2000) (testimony of FCC Comm'r
Furchtgott-Roth).
157 Commissioner Powell makes a similar suggestion. See
MCI-WorldCom Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 18165-66 (separate
statement of Comm'r Powell).
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for an unrelated policy goal in order to further
promote a desired policy objective.
VII. CONCLUSION
Rapid advances in technology have pushed the
communications industry into a converged envi-
ronment where a specific service is no longer tied
to a specific transmission medium. This has
blurred the lines between industry sectors. The
current regulatory framework that is based upon
the assumption of a specific service being tied to a
specific transmission medium is not applicable to
these converged services and is quickly becoming
outmoded. Although this convergence will likely
necessitate an overhaul of the current statutory
underpinnings of the regulatory framework, this
is time-intensive, and converged services must be
dealt with in a consistent manner in the interim
period.
Merger conditions offer a viable interim solu-
tion as an alternative to general regulations appli-
cable to the entire industry. Use of merger condi-
tions allows the FCC some relief from working
within the strictures of an outmoded regulatory
scheme of service classification by underlying
transmission medium. In a rapidly evolving mar-
ket, merger conditions offer the advantage of a
faster process than rulemaking. Merger condi-
tions also offer a way to "test" regulation of a con-
verged service. If the result is not desirable, it can
be waived more quickly than a rule can be re-
pealed. A condition also only affects the merged
entity, rather than being applicable to the entire
industry so that any negative impact would be
minimized. Merger conditions would still have sig-
nificant effect given the size and numbers of com-
panies merging in the industry. However, if
merger conditions are to be used to effectuate
regulation on converged services, the process
must be predictable, somewhat transparent, and
conditions must have a reasonable nexus to a le-
gitimate and clearly identified public interest
harm in order to lend certainty to business deci-
sions and validity to Commission decisions.
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